“PECULIARITIES OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN POST-COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.: (THE examplesCASES OF MACEDONIA, SERBIA, MONTENEGRO, AND BULGARIA

Svetlana Stamenova

)”[1]

Does Zero-Sum Social Reasoning Affect Political Culture in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bulgaria? [1]

One of the most widespread definitions of political culture describes it as “a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideas, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country and the role of the self in that system” (L. Diamond, 1994: 7). The concept is usually used as an explanatory variable in politics. However, we share the convictionI believe that “political culture” is not an explanatory concept by itself but a construction that needs to be explained.

Cultural explanations arehave recently been used to elucidate the relative failures of building democracy in Russia and some other post-communist countries. Indeed, why were some post-communist countries more successfuleded in their transformation more than others, whileen the starting point for all was seemingly equal – the demolition of the institutions of the communist party-state? So, why did the point of arrival of the post-communist systemic change turned out to be different for various countries? And is it by chanceaccidental that there are regional divisions in the success of post-communist transformation, the Central European countries being more successful than the Southeast European states or some of the former Soviet republics? Can it be explained with thein terms of the “wrong” democratic institution building in the unsuccessful countries, or are there are other factors that are responsible for their relative failure to democratize? Can the concept of culture be satisfactory enough to explain the differences, and how we can we verify a cultural explanation? And how we could we explain the very cultural differences and similarities of regions and countries?

WeI argue that the pure cultural explanation of political change should be additionally reinforced by a historical explanation – otherwise the specifics in regional and national political cultures would be viewed as unexplainable substances, as inextricable and unchangeable characteristics of the people inhabituating these regions and countries.

So, political culture will be defined in theis study as an historically shaped popular perception of politics, a set of political loyalties, beliefs, values, and expectations (modes of social reasoning) that are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups. The political culture of Southeast Europe will be viewed as a subject that cannot be described in a straightforward manner but only in a step-by-step manner, thus revealing different levels and elements. Therefore, rather than using cultural explanation, weI will employ a historical explanation in order to elucidate the peculiarities in the political cultures inof the four examined Southeast European countries being in question.

The purpose of the project is twofold:

1. To provide a picture of public attitudes and mental modes of reasoning of the population in the four post-communist Balkan countries in relation to democracy and inter-ethnic understanding;

2. To try to explain the historical and cultural roots of these modes of social reasoning.

The main aimgoal of ourthe analysis is to try to checkfind out whether there is a trace of some specific historical legacies of the region, reflected in the way of social reasoning of the population, and whether these legacies of social reasoning affect the level of democratic support and inter-ethnic tolerance in the countries under examination. Thus, the main object that will be studied is the impact of a prevailing cultural norm in the region, which determines perception of social relations as a zero-sum game. The tradition of a zero-sum perception of social and economic relations has perpetuated the belief that ‘your acquisition of goods, rights, etc. is equivalent to my (potential) loss of these goods and rights’ (see Shopflin, 2000; Offe, 1997). The idea that both parties could gain is considered naïve and impossible. Actually, zero-sum social reasoning has its sources in pre-modern societies where it appears to be the main principle of resource distribution. It is, also, a characteristic of social reasoning in economically backward societies with long-existing patriarchal social structures.

What I am going to examine is to what extent and in what way thatis particular cultural norm influences inter-ethnic perception in the region and support for the market economy and democracy. Also, I will try to verify whether the ‘zero-sum game’ perception of politics and inter-ethnic relations is accompanied and strengthened by the same pattern of zero-sum economic reasoning.

Between-country difference will not be presupposed on the theoretical level of the study. Thus, keeping in mind the differences between Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro weI will not account for them at the level of hypotheses. Therefore, the between-country differences will be expected as a probable result of the analysis of empirical findings.

In order to understand the peculiarity of Southeast European political culture [2] we have to define the main differences between the Western and the Southeast European models of historical development.[2] The Western European case will be used as a frame of reference through which the processes in Southeast European countries will be analyzed and which determines the way in which the comparison is made. The stressed contrast with some Western historical specificspeculiarities will announcehighlight the differences that are considered significant for the purpose of the study - , revealing of the formation of the structural features that are decisive for the specificscharacteristics of political culture in the region. No axiological superiority or inferiority will be presumed during the analysis of the historical specificsfeatures of the two regions.

2/ Peculiarities of Southeast European Cultural History

We shalI will first try to clarify some of the most salient specificsfeatures of the Southe Eeast European’s cultural history, which are significantly different from thethose of Western European. The two regions vary significantly in thehave had different types of Christianity tradition since the early medieval timesperiod.: Tthe Roman Catholic and the Orthodox forms of Christianity. They have molded two cultural models, that hadwhich have had important impact upon the specifics of value systems of the populations under their influence. These two different civilizational orbits have created distinct popular understandings of the meaning of life and death, the role of action and its purpose in people’s lives, the degree of solidarity between people, the way of life and the specificspeculiarities of moral norms.

The distinct religious models have had significant consequences for the very mode of the relationship between the Church and the state,, which was constitutive for the medieval society. Balkan religious culture was developed under the direct influence of the Byzantine Orthodox culture that relied on the Caesar-Pope principle organizationally connecting the Church with the secular political powerauthorities. Hence, the Byzantine cultural model powerfully influenced the formation of the Southeastern European statehood. Not only the Orthodox Christianity, but also the socio-political structure of the Byzantine Empire was taken as a chief model in the foundation of the medieval states in the region. These religion-based cultural specificsfeatures formed the consequent ssocio-structural and political peculiarities key to understanding attitudes towards political authorities, without which centuries which have been reproduced and transmitted attitudes to political authorities could not be understoodfor centuries.

There were some peculiarities of the socio-political system of the Byzantine Eempire in which itwere differednt from the Western European models. The main specificsaspects of the Western political tradition lay in the separation of religious and secular legitimization. The competition between the ruler and the Church made it possible for the third parties to emerge with their own sources of power. Thus, autonomy and the separation of spheres and division of power remained a crucial feature of the Western European political patterns and became the foundation for the extension of liberties (see Schopflin, 19901). The Eastern cultural and political archetype was much more hierarchical than that of the West. One of its specificspeculiarities was that the religion and its institution -, the Church, were submittedordinate to the state. The state itself was highly centralized. There were Nno landowners independent of the central power landowners existedauthorities, and the possession of land was arranged through thea system of emperor's gifts. These were givenawarded to aristocrats thatwho behaved in accordance towith the emperor's will, and as a resultthus reinforced of their obedience to him. Exactly tThis socio-political system of strong centralized state power with permanent mobility of the social strata was ‘borrowed’ by the newly formed Balkan states sinceafter the mid 9^th century AD.

Thus, the state was the leading factor within the whole system of political, social and cultural relations. This feature defined property relations as well as the relation to property of the highest social stratum – the aristocracy. The aristocracy did not rely on private property, but on state distribution and redistribution. This maintained the position of state bureaucrats who depended entirely on the central power in the hands of the emperor. If an aristocrat at some time was a landowner, it was because he was in power at that moment – but he was not in power because he was a landowner, likeas in the case of classic feudalism oftypical of Western typeEurope. There was not feudal property with guaranteed immunity and, consequently,, there was not feudal hierarchy, but state or political hierarchy. The Balkan aristocracy of the medieval timesperiod was a political rather than economic category.

Something moreLike the aristocracy, culture and, in particular, religion, andwith its chief institution, - the Church, - existed as basedwere also subordinate to on political power and not as independent agent. Every change the political power relations influenced the Church and the clergy. What was true about the land gifts to aristocracy was trueapplied equally to the Orthodox clergy. Therefore, the model of Church power in the region during medieval times was also borrowed from the Byzantium. Following the spirit of the Byzantine political conception, the authority of the Church power was similarly submittedordinate to the Tsar too, who not only appointed not only the high church priests but also the very head of the Orthodox cChurch. Those who dominated politics also dominated culture too.. The state was that institution by which determined the strength and the fate of culture relied /(see N. Genchev, 1988/). These peculiarities of the Byzantine socio-political model drove historians to speak about two different types of feudalism – the economic feudalism of the Western worldEurope, and the political feudalism of the Eastern European cultural model, which had its roots in the Byzantine cultural and political model.

The Eastern European cultural model influenced to a significant degree the model of social and political relations in Southeast Europe.

Contrary to the widespread argument about the interruption of the political history of the region due to the Ottoman invasion, recent studies underline the continuity between the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empire in respect to exercise of power and the centralized role of the state (see M. Mazouwer, 2000).

The Balkan institutionalizsed Balkan culture of the Medieval timesMiddle Agesperiod was destroyed through ruining ofas the only institutions of the ChristianOrthodox culture -, the churches, were ruined. The specific Caesar-Pope principle of close connection between the church and the state powerauthorities meant that the liquidationdestruction of the state power by the Ottoman Turks was, at the same time, a cultural incident that destroyed the official cultural system and altered culture in its every-day forms, restricting elitist cultural creativity to a minimum. The religious centers, - the churches -, were destroyed during the beginning of the Ottoman conquest,, which and this caused deep changes in popular cultural life. Thus, for centuries, Balkan cultures lacked a stable cultural and ideological center (see N. Genchev, 1988).

The liquidated dominant role of the Orthodox religion on the level of official structures was thus substituted by popular and every-day level Balkan culture. That culture of the low social strata perpetuated for centuries a strange mixture of the Balkans-Turkish mentality where the cultural sphere coincided with every-day practice. As a result, the family appeared to be the main transmitter and protector of the Balkan culture in its forms of native language and the Christian religionous tradition. The latter was maintained only on the level of every-day morality. Thus, family structures carried out the functions of the whole cultural system, but on the level of archaic patriarchal every-day relations. The connection between individual and society was performed through low-level patriarchal institutions – peasant community and family, and notrather than through the high-level clerical cultural institutions as church, for example, like itas was the case in Western and Central Europe. For centuries, the Balkan populations lived without the national states and the national churches. This facthas produced some important specificsfeatures in the meaning system and the social behavior of the Balkan people which can still be seenthat are still alive today. For all these reasons, both structural and cultural, after the Ottoman conquest, the Balkan populations wasere formed and existed for five centuries as exclusively peasant in characternature, with prominent egalitarian cultural characteristics, which were enforced by the lack of hierarchical social stratification.

The exercise of power in the Ottoman Empire couldan be described usingwithin the Weber's patrimonial type of rule. The distinctive characteristic of patrimonializsm is highly personalized exercising of power, the absence of clear distinction between the state and the ruler's household, and the of official from private affairs, the unmediated exercise of power, the personal obedience of officials to the ruler, the tendency to regard the state as a source for of provisions for the ruler, and the use of tradition as a main principle of legitimization (see P. N. Diamandouros and F. S. Larrabee, 2000: 29-30). Therefore, in contrast to Western Europe, the legacies of Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire in respect to political power and state, on one hand, and civil society creation, on the other, were much more unfavorable.

Inter-ethnic Relations

The peaceful inter-ethnic relations enjoyed during Ottoman rule were due to the millet system – administrative structures containing subjects of the same religion and thus separating one religious group from another. The main principlepillar of identity was, therefore, was the religiousn. This peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence came to an end with the rise of the nationalist movements, which eroded the primacy of the religious identity. Thus, in contrast to the image of the 'ancient hatreds' often ascribed to the region, the inter-ethnic problems of Southeast Europe appear to be rooted in the relatively recent development of the region – that of the beginning of 20^th century.

B. Zero-sum Social Reasoning and its Sources in the Southeast European History

As mentioned above, zero-sum social reasoning has its source in pre-modern societies where the zero-sum game appears to be the main principle of resource distribution. It is, also, a characteristic of social reasoning in economically backward societies with long-existing patriarchal social structures and a predominant peasant population. Peasantry is a permanent and overwhelming social category in the history of Southeast European societies. The most striking feature of Balkan peasantry was the lack of the experience with theof serfdom during Ottoman rule. (see P. Sugar, 1977). Thus, tThe system of serfdom was unknown here, in contrast to the Western, Central European, and Russian regions. The Ottoman political system was sustained by political and military power, but not through economic mechanisms, as it was in the Western Europe. However, the complicated system of ownership and the numerous taxes and restrictions on possession of the land imposed to theby peasants, along with some specifics infeatures of the peasant inheritance law, made impossible the maintainingenance of relatively biggerlarger land holdings. This fact perpetuated the figurepredominance of the peasant petty landholders almost until the communist impositiontakeover. As a result of distinct property and power relations, the social structure of the region was quite different from that of the Western Europe. It is characterized byincluded a large peasantry and lackno ofindigenous aristocracy, features which fostered strong egalitarian attitudes among the populace.

The Ottoman conquest has interrupted the elitist cultural line for a long time in Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serbian history. The old aristocracy was liquidateliminated and, with it, the mechanism of transmission of the old cultural experience was ceasedabolished, and the continuity of cultural production stoppeddisrupted. The ceased for centuries disappearance of the elitist line in Southeast European culture for several centuries caused irreducible consequences for its culture and socio-psychological characteristicspopular social reasoning. It created a totally new condition in which these societies entered the Mmodern timesperiod during the late 18^th and 19^th century (see N. Genchev, 1988). The lack of the intermediate body of aristocracy and the lack of a religious-ideological center, which is independent from the Ottoman state deprived Southeast European peasantry for centuries of an institution thatwhich could unite people and create the idea of a common virtue and a common good. Thus, it was very difficult for a peasant to go beyond his individual (close community defined) interests and to find the connection between the private and the public, or to be more precise, to see the link between the habitual perception of what is goodness for the community and the self, on the one hand, and the state, on the other hand.

High levels of distrust and vague idea of public good and public virtues facilitate zero-sum reasoning. It is reinforced by negative (Shopflin) or leveling (Diamandouros) egalitarianism that tends to cause the downfall of all that is different. The leveling character of the region's egalitarianism and the personified exercising of power within the Ottoman Empire contributed to the creation of a profoundly vague and suspicious perception of political power and of its most powerful institution – the state. Due to the highly personal and unmediated exercising of power, these societies were characterized by a weak capacity of formal structures /(institutions/) to protect ruledsubjects from the arbitrary exercising of power.

One additional feature of these societies is their strong antipathy towards political divisions (Diamandoulos and Larrabee, 2000: 35). Fear of political divisions is actually a pre-modern phenomenon and is usually a characteristic of societies with large peasant populations. For centuries, local peasants’ communities (whatever their criteria for distinction were – religious or ethnic) existed as againstin opposition to the Ottoman state and state-dependent institutions. The result was perpetuation of the conditions resistinghindering the emergence of pluralist societies and the preservingation of the zero-sum perception of power relations,, which limitsing the acceptance of interests, compromise and positive-sum logics as constitutive attitudes required by modern politics (see Diamandoulos and Larrabee, 2000).

Thus, the overwhelmingly peasant character of Southeast European societies furthered the emergence of powerful collectivist attitudes and practices including the distrust of the political division. Due to the postponedbelated and weak modernization of the region,, which started at the end of 19^th and the beginning of the 20^th century, the figure of theBalkan populations remained predominantly rural peasant was kept alive untill the communist impositiontakeover. The Eeconomic backwardness of the region did not allow for the emergence of dense and numerous working class populations to appear neither didor a strong bourgeoisie. The social status of the hired laborlabor in agriculture and industry in the region during the capitalist period was also somewhat peculiar. A ‘pure type’ of people totally deprived fromof property, of the means of production, including the land, could be foundexisted in a very limited numbers during the whole pre-war period. TheFor a century, Balkan workers maintained the mixed consciousness of a workers and a petty owners. This peculiarity even survived communist modernization during which “the worker will continue to feed and revive the petty owner rather than the opposite” (N. Genchev, 1986: 153). Thus, weak class identification ihas remained a typical characteristifeaturec of the region due tobecause of the predominantly lively peasant characternature of modernlocal societies in the region up tountil the communist installationtakeover and even after it.

The bourgeoisie in the region also differs significantly from the classical Western capitalists in its genesis, the scope of activity, and mentality. During the period of Ottoman rule, the egalitarian social structure was heldretained due todue to a lack of conditions necessary for the appearance of upper wealthy upper classes and economically independent social groups. Therefore, the bourgeoisie of the region was born from the peasantry and petty craftsmen inthrough a difficult process and had not connection withto the old aristocracy. It began its social life from almost zeroa very low economic and cultural level (with the exception of Romania and to some extendt of Greece). From that point of viewThis meant that all characteristics of the peasants’ social reasoning were applicable for the new Southeast European bourgeoisie as well.

The two streamsprinciples of political legitimization in pre-modern society – imperial and religious – were quite weak in the region (see Diamandourous and Larrabee, 2000….). From country to country, there are differences and specificspeculiarities, which, however, do not change the main picture of pre-modern political legitimization. So, the tradition of weak political loyalties is deeply rooted in social consciousness ofwithin the region. The most widespread type of political allegiance is that of client-patron networks (originationing from the political structure of Byzantium and then reinforced during Ottoman rule). This kind of allegiance is, that is primarily based on informal and even family relations and is reward oriented. That type of allegianceIt is determined by zero-sum reasoning and additionally supports it.

The strong ethnic bases of state and nation-formationbuilding processes as compared withto civic processes of thein Western Europe presuppose a dominance of ethnicity- based national identityies over political or class-based identityies. This fact predetermined the leading role of culture (mainly folk culture) and language for nation and state formation-building as compared to the strong role of institutions in the Western European societies. Thus, national homogenization during the nation-formation period was primarily based on vernacular ethnicity and not on the concept of citizenship, idea as was the case in the Western Europe. Therefore, the very genesis of nation and state formation-building in the region presupposes the leading role of ethnicity for national and state cohesion. As a result, ethnicity, but notrather than formal institutions wasbecame the main element that constructed thecomponent of national identities in the region. The ethnic foundation of the Balkan states is reinforced by language as the main principle identifyingindicator of the ethnic belonging and thus, the ethnic nature of the nation-state. Due to the lack of institution’ -based identity it is difficult to develop a civic dimension of nationhood. As Schopflin rightly points out, in the region civic virtue is collapsed into cultural virtue and is identified with mono-lingualism (Schopflin, 2000: 125). The lLanguage- oriented national identity is strengthened by the absence of developed high culture (that was substituted withreplaced by the traditional folk culture), which could be alsoserve as a useful ground for national identification.

Therefore, zero-sum game social reasoning supported by political loyalty organized around informal client-patron relationships, as well as a zero-sum understanding and exercisinging of political power in the period between the two world wars resulted in a very weak civic dimension of Southeast European societies. The sState-society relations in the region were characterized by the weak organizational ability of the social actors and a low level of interest articulation. The lack of historically produced intermediate bodies in the exercising of power undermined the ability of the civil society to define itself actively in relation to the state as well asand to develop and articulate a sense of collective civic identity. These peculiarities made difficult the appearance of a set of shared public values on which form the basis of citizenship is grounded. It is almost impossible to construct citizenship on the basis of ethnic mobilization. Identification of the state with the patron–client relationships reinforced the suspicionus attitudes towards the state and made problematical the development of a civicl society in which the relationships between the public and private sphere are clearly regulated and transparent. Rather, an understanding of the public sphere as a privatized sphere has remained predominatesnt in the region thatand has reinforced the patrimonial line in theits development of the regionup to the present day. The communist regimes after the Second World War built upon the aversion of the Balkan population towards politics;, and post-communist political practices in the region have turned outtended to be a revivale of the old-living “patron-client” relationships.

Communist Experience

The cCommunist experience additionally strengthenedreinforced zero-sum social reasoning by through the shortage economic system based on soft budget constraints and limited resources[3], resources, material and symbolic goods (see Janos Kornai, 1985). That system, and bolsteredboosted the common understanding that these resources and goods are given in unchanged quantityies, so that one person’s gain is another's person’s loss. That systemIt encouraged once again patron-client networks based on the illegal exchange of goods and statuses.

The Ccommunist state was successful in the creation of a rationalized etatic identity, strongly dependent on the communist party-state as a substitute for civic identity. The modernizing attempts of the communist regime put in force theestablished a direct linkage of each person as an individual to the state, allowing collectivities to exist primarily onat the level of socialist enterprises. Thus, the communist system did create a specific socialist identity with its own career patterns and public achievements. Within this type of socialist-etatic identity, each individual and community directly depended on the state for the redistribution of both material and symbolic goods.

Therefore, despite the forced modernization of the region during the communist period, there arewere two factors that strengthenedwhich reinforced the zero-sum social reasoning despite forced modernization of the region during communist period. One is the shortage economic system, a limited goods system, that turned family and friendship circles and even the communities of ethnic minorities into channels for the distribution of scarce material and symbolic goods. (J. Kornai, 1985). The other factor, determining the strength of zero-sum thinking during theunder communism is the forced atomization of the society and the opaqueness of the public sphere over which the individual had no control. Thus, the very public sphere itself exercised power over the individual. The fear and distrust created by the overwhelming ‘public’ sphere represented by the party-state was damaging to the integration intoemergence of a civic identity, a characteristic of the developed democracies. Etatic identity was accompanied by the total lack of civil society. Additionally, the forced migration to the cities of a large amountnumbers of peasants, rather than dilute their way of life and social reasoning, turned cities into semi-urbanized areas (see Schopflin, 2000).

Ever-lasThe utingnending zero-sum social reasoning intypical of the region reinforced in turn the existing weak civic identity and was supported by common public distrust. Political distrust broke down only within the close communities – likeas the family and friendship circles. Thus, the communist system, which aimminged at to excludinge society forom the political power,, has createdin fact fostered a its far-reaching de-politicization. It also and additionally strengthened the old Southeast European belief that nothing could be achieved through political action. This understanding is reinforced by the patrimonial state bornthe habitual believef born within the patrimonial state that those onin power are substantially and principally uncontrollable, that they run the society for their own private interests and that they are a priori amoral. Thus, the state and exercising of power by political authorities are evaluated by the moral criteria of good and evil. These tendencies of social reasoning concerning politics werewere intensified during the post-communist period. All communist deficiencies turned out to be countera-productive in the development of a stable democracy and civil society.

Post-communismm.

The strength and the political role of the ethnic identity depends on the strength of the state and civil society – the weaker are the state and the civic identity, the stronger the is ethnic identity (see Schopflin, 2000). Post-communism in its early stage could be defined as a society where a weak state meets a weak civil society. Some authors even argue that the states disappeared along with the collapse of the communist states in 1989-1990. Thus, post-communism is characterized by the simultaneous construction of a new state, together with a new civil society. The degree of success differs from country to country, but it is least successful in the South East European post-communist countries, partially due to the long-term historic heritage of the region described above. Therefore, ethnic identity remained the only identity that could create a feeling of stability was left to the ethnic identity. The weakness of the state and of civil society leaves room for a strong ethnic identity after communism, not only in Southeastern Europe but also in the whole post-communist world.

What Of central importance in this contextwe are mostly interested here are the conditions for the reproduction of the zero-sum social reasoning. Two factors have strengthened it,: first -, the way in which the political power is exercised, and second -, the changed economic logic behind the redistribution of the material and symbolic resources. These factors are strongly interrelated. From the perspective of political power, the client-patron relation in state governance has increased the level of popular distrust. There werehave been numerous attempts to build the new party structures as basedon the basis of on client-patron networks, efforts which is a kind of continuation offollow pre-communist political traditions. Due to inexperience with civil society and democratic principles,

the existing rules tend to be weakly regarded and seen as facades for the pursuit of private interests. In effect, there is a very marginal sense of the public sphere and the public good. They do exist but they are destroyed by distrust, disbelief, and the conviction that the exercise of power is taking place ‘elsewhere’ beyond the cognition and control of the individual. (G. Schopflin, 2000: 179).

In the economic sphere, the low level of law enforcement and the undefined rules of the economic and political game have created conditions for frightening and empowering the ‘mafia’ -type interests. Z. Bauman uses Turner’s notion of liminality to express exactly that kind of absence of clear-cut rules (Z. Bauman, 1994). The prolongation of the liminality period, especially in Southeastern Europe, has makesde possible the political representation of the ‘mafia’- type interests through different political lobbies represented onat governmental level. These lobbies which couldhave been able to control to their benefit, not only the economic but even political processes in adifferent countryies. These post-communist economic and political developments have increased popular distrust toof the post-communist economy and politics and reinforced once again the conspiracy way of thinking, that looks for simple explanations in moral terms of good and badevil.

Thus, political zero-sum reasoning, characterized by a low level of trust and suspicion that the country is run on behalf of a small amount number of people onat the top of the political and economic powerpyramid (reasoning in terms of moral criteria of good and evil), is accompanied by zero-sum reasoning in terms of interests – my gain is your loss and vice versa. These trends, which reinforces the lack of co-operation in the economic sphere.

4/) Basic Questions

The main questions addressed by this study the analysis should answer is whether the pre-modern cultural norm of zero-sum game reasoning that was enforced during the communist period still dominates the mass understandings of politics, inter-ethnic relations, and economy in the region.

1/) I Will examine to what extent and in which way that particular cultural norm influences the tolerance to ethnic minorities in the region, and support for the principles of a democratic regime.

2/) I will also try to verify whether this cultural norm of ‘zero-sum’ perception of politics and inter-ethnic relations is accompanied and strengthened by zero-sum economic reasoning. In this context, I will also verify whether there is an interrelation between zero-sum economic reasoning and the same type of perception of politics and inter-ethnic relations.

3/) The effect of the zero-sum thinking on support for market principles will also be studied. I am interested ito discovern whether a rise in support for thea democratic regime and market principles is accompanied by a corresponding diminishingdecrease of zero-sum game reasoning.

4/) Additionally, I want to verify whether the type of political representation of ethnic groups (corporative vs. civic) in the examined countries is based mainly on inter-ethnic social distances or if there are other factors that account for the choice of a preferred model of ethnic political representation over another.

WeI consider the corporate or power-sharing solution of ethnic political representation as a manifestation of zero-sum reasoning. This our view is based on strongly local arguments concerning the nature of inter-ethnic relations in the four examined countries where surveys were conducted. These relations as they arehave been formed by centuries lasting-long peaceful multi-ethnic coexistence in the regionthat has come, which came into itsto an end with the start of modernization processes in the region at the endin the late of 19^th and the beginning ofearly 20^th century. Thus, weI do not aim atto rejecting the conciliatory power of the corporate approach to ethnic cleavages. What weWhat I do argue is, instead, that this approach to ethnic political representation is does not offer a proper solution to inter-ethnic cleavages in the Southeeast Europe and could cause more harm than helpgood.

The Ppower-sharing solution ofto ethnic cleavages is based on the preassumption that ethnic conflicts are created by contact between groups holding irreconcilable culturally rooted values, so what is needed is a separation of ethnic groups from one another through disconnected networks of social and political organizations. Thus, inter-group contacts are restricted to elites, and the leaders of each group exercise the decision-making on issues of common interest (see S.L. Burg and P.S. Shoup, 1999: 6). The civic approach to ethnic political representation, which weI consider as most appropriate for the four examined countries calls for the avoidance of the definition of the state or state institutions in ethnic terms and the resolution of interethnic cleavages on the baseis of civic solidarity and citizens’ integration – irrespective of ethnic group belonging – into the common whole of a democratic and tolerant national community (see O. Minchev, 2000). weI argue, therefore, that the more developed the is the civic identity in the four countries examined, the less profound the inter-ethnic cleavages – a correlation which we I will try to test with ourthe data collected.

A note should be made here.I would like to note that Tthe hypotheses I proposed will not be concentratfocused upon between-country differences. These differences (if any) would be a result of the data analysis.

6/) Hypotheses:

1/) Our first hypothesis is that there is an interrelation of ‘zero-sum game’ perceptions of the economy, politics, and inter-ethnic relations (Hypothesis 1).

2/) Support for democratic regime principles is accompanied by non-zero-sum game reasoning about the economy, politics, and inter-ethnic relations. So, non-zero-sum reasoning will be one of the main determinants of support for a democratic regime (Hypothesis 2). I expect the same to be valid for the support for market principles – the stronger the market-oriented thinking is, the stronger will be the non-zero-sum perceptions of the economy, politics, and ethnic cleavages (Hypothesis 3).

3/) Zero-sum game perceptions isare one of the main determinants of ethnic intolerance – the higher the ethnic social distances are, the stronger isthe zero-sum political and economic reasoning (Hypothesis 4).

Empirical Findings

TheMy first of our hypotheseis insists states that there is an interrelation between zero-sum perceptions of politics, the economy (both as general principles at the foundation of the economic relations rest upon, and as a real result of the construction of the social matters in the country), politics and as well as a perception of the model of representation of the interests of different ethnic groups in the society. IWei have used factor analysis in order to check supposposited interrelationships (see Table 5-1). As a result of the factor analyses made withincarried out for each country of examination, we I can conclude that there is a clear connection between zero-sum perceptions of politics and zero-sum perceptions of economic reality in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro.

WhatIt is important to be mentioned isnote that there are interesting differences between the Macedonian case and all the others. There is a clear connection between the non-corporate or civic vision of ethnic political representation, and zero-sum perceptions of the real economic relationships where the two examined variables (48.1 and 48.5) compose one factor. In all other countries except Macedonia, zero-sum perceptions of ethnic political representation composesform one factor in combination with inter-ethnic social distances and isare thus, is not unconnected with to the other forms of zero-sum thinking.[3].[4]

Therefore, we can a conclusionde should be made that in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro there is a close connection between zero-sum perceptions of politics and zero-sum perceptions of economic relations as a current socio-economic reality. No connection between them and zero-sum perceptions of ethnic political representation is observed in these countries. On the other hand, in Macedonia, the zero-sum perceptions of actualexisting economic relations isare accompanied by with non-zero-sum perceptions of ethnic political representation.

Thus, we can accept our hHypothesis (1) with the cautionqualificatiopn that there are between-countries differences. In any case, we could draw acan conclude conclusion that, probably, in times of strongdeep inter-ethnic cleavages what is reinforced is not so much the connection between politics and inter-ethnic relations is that is strengthened, but thatthat between of the perceptions of economic matters in the country, and the conceptsvision of ethnic political representation.

Determinants of Support for Democratic Regime Principles

With the exception of Bulgaria, the data (Table 1-1->1-4) supportscorroborate our Hypothesis 2 on the effect of non-zero-sum thinking upon support for a democratic regime. The more the respondents believe that the enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of its citizens, the more supportive of a democratic regime are they are. This connection is observed in the case of both in Macedonian (0.145) and Serbian (0.08) cases, but in Macedonia, it is the strongest of all. There is no effect of non-zero-sum thinking upon support for a democratic regime in Montenegrino case.

While there tends to be strong non-zero-sum reasoning about politics among supporters of a democratic regime in Bulgaria, support for democracy is accompanied by zero-sum reasoning about the current rules of the economy and its principles as developed in the country in the years of post-communist transformation. This needs an additional clarification. A discrepancy between political and economic post-communist reforms is the main peculiarity aspect of the Bulgarian’s systemic transformation that should be taken into account when analyzing that period. Political reforms there have started earlier thanbefore the economic reforms. This allowed two types of interests to be petrified. Firstly, dDue to the lack of economic reforms, the old socialist- type egalitarian and collectivist interests were kept alive during the whole period of post-communist transformation. Secondly, tThe illegal and even criminal redistribution of national wealth has additionally strengthened zero-sum perceptions of post-communist economic rules among the Bulgarian population and adds to diminishingweakened the very support for democracy itself, being as it the lowest among the countries examined. This is well seencan be observed bywhen comparing the means of ourthe indexes of support for a democratic regime in the examined countries (Bulgaria 6.43; Montenegro 7.75; Serbia 7.50; Macedonia 6.85).

In all the countries examined (with the exception of Montenegro), there is an effect of non-zero-sum political thinking upon support for a democratic regime which is more powerful than thatthe effect of non-zero-sum economic thinking. We can make the general conclusion that, with the exception of Montenegro and to some extent Bulgaria, non-zero-sum thinking about politics and economy increases support for a democratic regime.

Inter-ethnic acceptance and lower social distances among different ethnic groups is another powerful determinant of support for democracy, though Bulgaria is again exceptionn. The higher is the acceptance of minority ethnic groups, the higher is the support for democratic regime principles in Serbia (0.115), Montenegro (0.17) and Macedonia (0.08). There is no such connection in the case of Bulgarian case. As far as there are no t predominant inter-ethnic cleavages in Bulgaria and inter-ethnic tolerance is a natural and self-evident state of social relations, there is no causal relationship between support for a democratic regime and inter-ethnic social distances are not in causal connection.

Thus, in all other cases, there is a direct connection between acceptance of minority ethnic groups and support for democracy – the higher the social distances between different ethnic groups, the lower the support for a democratic regime. Differences in the strength of thatis connectionrrelation are due to the experience of ethnic conflict experienceof the the respondents of thein different countries.

Determinants of Social Distances between Ethnic Groups

OurThe data (Table 2-1 -> 12-4) shows quiterather interesting results, which couldmay provoke some thought on the causes of ethnic conflicts in the Balkans. It turnedThey indicate out that the most powerful determinant of minority group acceptance in Bulgaria and Macedonia is the belonging of the respondents to the minority groups themselves – it is the representatives of minority groups who are most tolerant to minoritysuch groups are the very representatives of these groups (Bulgaria +0.30; Macedonia +0.25). This result is an indicatores that there are serious inter-ethnic social distances among the ethnic majority and the minority ethnic groups in these two countries. However, in the Bulgarian index of inter-ethnic social distances this effect is caused by tresults from the very low acceptance of the Roma minority. As the sStudies on the recent development of inter-ethnic tolerance show, that in the lastrecent years there has been growth in anti-Roma prejudice, while at the expense of the diminishing negative attitudes towards Turks and Bulgarian Muslims. have decreased (see A. Zhelyazkova, 2001b). The same effect of minority group belonging upon inter-ethnic social distances can be observed in Montenegro but is not so strong (0.15). There is not such a connection in Serbian.

Support for democratic regime and market principles are the others powerful determinants of the acceptance of ethnic minorities acceptance (regression coefficients of Ssupport for democratic regime index: Serbia (0.11); Montenegro (0.12); Macedonia (0.10); regression coefficients of market thinking index: Serbia and Bulgaria (0.08); Montenegro (0.09); Macedonia (0.10). The Ssupport for the democracy index does not appear asto affecting social distances among ethnic groups in Bulgaria, however, due tofor the above-explained reasons explained above.

There is an effect of non-zero-sum economic thinking upon inter-ethnic acceptance in the case of Serbia onlyn case only. Therefore, we can accept Hypothesis 2 in this Serbian case only. In Bulgaria, the zero-sum perception of actualthe existing economic rules in the country (0.09) increases the acceptance of minority ethnic groups acceptance. This is due to the peculiarity ofthe above-mentioned specific of the Bulgarian’s post-communist transformation mentioned above. The rules of the economic game are perceived to be so corruptcorrupt and unfair there that the very perception of the economic rules as corrupt one fosters inter-ethnic tolerance. Zero-sum economic thinking is accompanied by zero-sum political reasoning in the Bulgarian case. Thus,, low trust toin politicians increases inter-ethnic tolerance (0.08) and does notrather than decreaseing it. This effect of zero-sum perceptions of economic and political practices upon higher inter-ethnic acceptance proves the existence of a deeply rooted culture of ethnic toleration ‘from below’, thatindependent of does not depend on the often contradictory interests of political elites and the poor economic results of their policies. InOn the other hand, the suspicions of the fairness of economic and political practices in Bulgaria strengthens inter-ethnic acceptance. These results confirm the Zhelyazkova’s arguments that the peaceful coexistence amongof different ethnic groups in Bulgaria is rooted in the traditions of communal life and thus, is communal level determined. For these multi-ethnic communities

cooperative effort to resolve local problems is often a strategy for neutralizing policies initiated at the highest national level and thus diffusing their potentially explosive and destructive impact (Zhelyazkova, 2001b).

We observe Vvery interesting results are observed in relation to non-zero-sum perceptions of political representation of different ethnic groups as an independent variable. (“The leaders of our country should serve the interests of all the people in the country regardless of ethnic origin or religion” vs. “the leaders of our country should mostly serve the interests of their own ethnic community”.) This variable is considered as an indicator of the respondents’s non-acceptance of the corporate principle in inter-ethnic relationships. The strongest effect of non-zero-sum perception of the political representation of ethnic groups upon inter-ethnic social distances is observed in Bulgarian case (0.14, ) / Table 2-1/). It also exists in Serbian case (0.10), but there is no such a connection to be found in the results for Macedonian and Montenegrino results. If we consider inter-ethnic social distances as deeply rooted and historically formed attitudes towards ‘the others’ thatwhich are not socannot be easily changeabled, then we can say that the civic solution formodel of ethnic political representation is naturally connected to low interethnic social distances – traditional for Bulgaria and in Serbia, a result of the traumatic experience of war experience (see Zhelyazkova, 2001a).

Determinants of Market Oriented Thinking (Table 3-1 -> 3-4)

Of our dependent variables – the support for democratic regime, inter-ethnic social distances, and market-oriented thinking indexes – it is upon the latter that the non-zero-sum reasoning has the strongest effect. In all the cases examined, non-zero-sum economic and political thinking appears to be a characteristic of the very market reasoning of the respondents. Bulgarian case is not an exception in this respect, although the effect of the variables of non-zero-sum reasoning is weakest in comparison to the other three cases (see Table 3-1).

There is an interesting relationship between the degree of development of the market thinking of the respondents and zero-sum reasoning about ethnic political representation. Thatis effect is observed only in the case of Macedonian case only – the more acceptable toing of market principles are the respondents, the more of a zero-sum oriented vision of ethnic political representation they have. Thus, they prefer the power-sharing solution to of inter-ethnic cleavages, that is, they are in favor of ethnically- based political representation instead of civic -based (see Table 3-4). This finding provokes serious thought on the resolution of the inter-ethnic conflicts in Macedonia. The Ccivility of the economic reasoning of the respondents there, thatwhich includes market-oriented thinking, does not suppose a choice of the civic model of ethnic political representation. This empirical result might be affected by the higher level of market-oriented thinking among the minority ethnic groups in Macedonia (Roma and Albanians) in comparison with the Macedonian majority. This disparity which iscan be observed by comparing means of market thinking indexes within each ethnic group – in the Albanian community, the mean is 12.74, while in the Macedonian community, it is 10.73. However, even if this is the main source of that empirical result, it can only prove that ethnic minorities in Macedonia prefer the corporate representation of ethnic groups. There is no connection between the zero-sum vision of ethnic political representation and market thinking in all the other cases examined.

Another interesting result is the effect of inter-ethnic social distances upon market thinking – the more tolerant to ethnic minorities are the respondents in Serbia (0.085), Macedonia (0.07) and Montenegro (0.13), the more developed market reasoning they have. Again, the only exception is the Bulgaria,n case where there is not such a connection. This, which again proves that ethnic peace in the country is the deeply rooted and relatively independent from the recent developments in social thinking.

Additionally, we should mentionnote the impact of socio-structural variables upon market thinking – the type of ownership of the enterprises in which the respondents and their families are employed and their occupational status isare a powerful determinants of market thinking in Bulgaria and Macedonia where economic reforms started earlier than in Serbia and Montenegro. In Serbia, socio-structural determinants on market reasoning are not connected to the type of ownership (private vs. state ownership) but to the family incomes and the amounts of savings – the higher is the income and the amount of the savings of the respondents, the more developed is their market thinking. This is due to the lack of economic reforms during Slobodan Milosevic’s rule.

Determinants of Ethnic Political Representation as a Zero-Sum Game

(Tables 4-1 -> 4-4)

Hypotheses: WeI hypothesize that the main determinants of zero-sum ethnic political representation will be the low support for a democratic regime (H1a) and low inter-ethnic tolerance (H1b). Additionally, weI propose that zero-sum reasoning about politics (H1c) and the economy (H1d) will foster a zero-sum vision of ethnic political representation.

This hypothesis (H1a) is proved to be rightcorrect for all cases examined. The same is true of H1b with the exception of the case of Macedonian. Inter-ethnic social distances have not impact upon the choice of ethnic political representation (civic vs. corporative) in Macedonia, that is, the acceptance/non-acceptance of ethnic minorities does not have a direct impact upon the people’s choice of ethnic political representation. What matters in Macedonian is the perception of the rules of economic game in the country as a zero-sum game. Thus, economic factors are more tightly connected with the choice of an ethnic political representation model than inter-ethnic social distances are. This finding means that the vision of ethnic political interest representation depends on other factors, independent from the deeply rooted and historically molded patterns of the perception of ethnic minorities and their acceptance/non-acceptance.

There is another interesting connection to be found in the case of Macedonian case – that of civic self-identity and rejection of ethnic political representation as based on corporate ethnic political rights. The more respondents in Macedonia define themselves in terms of profession, the more supportive are they are to civic and notrather than ethnically- based political representation (-0.11). Here weI find an empirical support offor ourmy general theoretical understanding conception aboutof the way inter-ethnic cleavages can be overcome and controlled. WeI have stated that the more developed civic identity is in a country, the less profound will be inter-ethnic cleavages will be. The connection between civic self-identity and a non-corporative vision of political representation of ethnic groups is confirmed in the case of Macedonian case.

Hypothesis (H1d) is partially proved by the cases of Bulgarian and Serbian cases – zero-sum thinking about ethnic political representation depends on zero-sum reasoning about economic principles. However, there is no connection between zero-sum ethnic political representation and perception of politics in terms of zero-sum game in all cases examined. So we can reject the hypothesis (H1c). Thus, the choice of ethnic political representation – corporate vs. civic – does not depend on the degree of political trust in the four countries examined but on support for the democratic political system.

Conclusion

At the end, weOn the basis of these results, we can can infer that there is indeed a connection between, on the one hand, the cultural norm of zero-sum thinking about politics and and economy, and, on the other hand, the level of support for a democratic regime, inter-ethnic tolerance and the vision of the role of the market in economy. Generally, Tthe Nnon-zero-sum reasoning of the respondents increases support for a democratic regime and a market economy in the countries examined and diminishesdecreases inter-ethnic social distances.

The only peculiar case is the Bulgarian one where the very zero-sum perceptions of economic reality and economic principles increaseraises support for democracy. Thatis peculiarity of the Bulgarian case was explained in the study by the difficulties of the post-communist transformation in the country, and the impact of ‘mafia’ -type lobbies upon the slow-goingslow economic reforms, and the persistence of as well as not weill-defined rules of the economic game for a long time during the transformation period. Thus, support for the a democratic regime in Bulgaria is increased not only by zero-sum perceptions of the rules of the current economic reality, but also by the very zero-sum perception of the economic principles as such. Hence, the understanding of the general economic laws as a zero-sum game is influenced by the economic practices in the country during the 12 years of post-communist transformation. Here we cannot explain the zero-sum economic attitudes of the among Bulgarians with their ‘stupidity’ or ‘underdevelopment’ because there is nothing in the heads of the individuals that does not reflects the social reality they inhabituate. The increased perception of economic rules in the country and in principle as a zero-sum game raises support offor a democratic regime and interethnic tolerance. This means that the low support for democratic regime principles and low interethnic acceptance are defined by non-zero-sum economic thinking. Thus, the evaluation of economic reality as fair presupposes an anti-democratic vision of the socio-political system in Bulgaria and low tolerance to ethnic minorities.

Thus, ourThis study thus proves that the political culture of a country or a region can indeed be better understood by looking at the historically formed construction of the modes of social reasoning in that country. What weIt discovered is that there is a connection between the zero-sum social thinking and the degree of support for democratic regime principles, and the market economy, and inter-ethnic tolerance. As a whole, the less profound is the zero-sum reasoning of the respondents in the countries under consideration, the more supportive toof democracy and the market are they, and the more tolerant to ethnic minority groups they are. Of course, there are deviations from this general tendency due to the deviations in the very social reality caused by the way post-communist transformation is implemented, Bulgarian being a case in point.[4]

We can infer that, all togetherin general, the development of non-zero-sum reasoning and of civic and individualized consciousness of theamong Balkan populations could foster democratic tendencies in the countries examined and could diminishdecrease inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts. OurThe data analysis proves that the roots of ethnic conflict in the region could only be removed through the developingment and encouragingement of the modernization processes in the region the roots of ethnic conflicts could be removed. OurThe findings are, also, provide an argument against the corporate approach into the resolvingution of ethnic conflicts in the four countries examined and for the preventingion of inter-ethnic conflicts on the basis of citizenship and not on the basis of ethnicit.

y.

Appendix 1 - Data and methodology

The data-source of the analysis is an empirical survey based on a representative cluster sample of allthe whole population in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia of over 18 years of age that I conducted between February and May 2001. For Bulgaria, it containsincluded of 1200 respondents, for Serbia – 1000, Montenegro – 500, and Macedonia – 820 respondents.

I created additive scales, used as indexes, for some of those dependent variables in order to compriseinclude biggera larger number of items as indicators for the mentioned synthetic dependent variables. These additive scales were made on the basis of the Cronbach's alpha coefficients (reliability item analysis). The received alpha coefficients are as follows:

Serbia; Montenegro; Macedonia; Bulgaria

Support for democracy index -> 0 .60 0.59 0.63 0.63

Specific support index-> 0.79 0.77 0.86 0.84

Market thinking index -> 0.85 0.73 0.70 0.86

European Union integration index -> 0.80 0.74 0. 81 0.88

Inter-ethnic social distances-> 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.93

The Ssupport for democracy index includes variables that measure some basic democratic principles, such as freedom of speech and freedom of association, multiparty system, need offor free elections and parliament. The Sspecific support index includes variables measuring support for the ruling government and for the main political figures ruling the country. The Mmarket thinking index consists of variables measuring the acceptance of the withdrawal of the state from the economy,. while The European Union index represents the popular acceptance of the EU and the support for the membership in that organization. The Iindex of inter-ethnic social distances consists of E. S. Bogardus scale.

I use factor and regression analyses in order to identify those variables thatwhich have the greatest effect on the dependent variables – support for the principles of democracy, inter-ethnic social distances, market oriented thinking and the vision of ethnic political representation.

8/) Operationalization of the hypotheses

Zero-sum perceptions of politics:

Q20 – the country is governed in the interest of a small number of people, who pursue their own interests, or for the common good of all people;;

Q38.5 – better not to trust politicians;;

Q 38.7 – ordinary people are always excluded from power;;

Q 38.8 – nowadays only people who meanwant to get rich go into politics.

These variables could also be used as a measurement of the degree of political trust. WeI use it from a slightly different point of view – a zero-sum perceptions of politics. It is well known that this type of reasoning is initially low-trust oriented and suspicious to all forms of political activity.

Zero-sum perceptions ofof the economy:

There is one major distinction that should be made – we willI distinguish between zero-sum perceptions of the actual state of the relationships and transactions in the economy of the society the respondents live in, and the zero-sum perceptions of the general principles ofunderlying economic transactions.

Thus, the zero-sum perceptions of the actual state of economy isare measured by:

Q 47.5 – in our country when some people get rich, others necessarily get poor;;

Q 48.1 – in our country a person can achieve a good livfe by involvement in illegal affairs and theft.;

The pPerceptions of the very principles of the economy as a zero-sum game isare measured by the following variables:

Q 47.6 – the enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens;;

Q 47.4 – it is possible that economic conflicts can be are resolved soin such a way that all parties concerned are winners;;

Q 47.3 – in the economy some people’s gain ins a gain for the entire economy;

Q 47.2 – in business affairs there are not necessarily losers in all cases.

Zero-sum perceptions of interethnic relations

Interethnic social distances could not be used as a measurement of zero-sum perceptions of interethnic relations but rather as a consequence of that type of thinking. So, we Iwill use one variable to measure that kind of perception.

Q 48.5 – the leaders of our country should mostly serve the interests of their own ethnic and religious community vs. the leaders of our country should serve the interests of all people in the country, regardless of ethnic origin or religion.

As above stated above, there are two ways of viewing the resolution of inter-ethnic cleavages – the corporate approach wherewhich emphasizes collectively defined rights are emphasized (collective rights for minorities), and the pluralist or citizenship- defined approach wherewhich stresses civic solidarity and the citizens’ integration irrespective of ethnic group belonging is emphasized. OurThe variable is designed to measure that type of vision of a preferred model of ethnic political representation.

Table 1-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable support for democratic regime index, Bulgaria

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1.European Union integration index 2.Market thinking index 3. Satisfaction with the communist regime 4. Parties serve leaders’ interests 5. Compare with economic situation of previous government 6. Zero-sum economic principles 7. Trust politicians 8. Zero-sum actual economic situation – in our country some people get rich, others necessarily get poor	2.939 0.114 5.476 -7.401 -0.238 6.439 -0.146 -0.142 0.153	0.16 0.15 -0.135 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 0.08	1.327 4.581 4.493 -3.944 -3.593 2.938 -2.699 -2.446 2.263
Observations: 1072	Adjusted R2: 0.42

Table 1-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable support for democratic regime index, Serbia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Comparison with previous government 2. Sociotropic economic attitudes – future 10 years 3. Parties serve leaders’ interests 4. Place of residence 5. Inter-ethnic social distances index 6. Market thinking index 7. Relative deprivation – compared with parents 8. Enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens 9. Trust politicians 10.Ordinary people excluded from power	1.225 5.067 0.316 -0.122 6.296 8.598 1.755 7.958 7.482 -7.487 6.801	0.16 0.14 -0.14 0.125 0.115 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.07 0.07	1.872 4.728 2.440 -3.881 3.365 3.525 2.595 3.012 2.658 -2.185 2.011
Observations: 1000	Adjusted R2: 0.30

Table 1-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable support for democratic regime index, Montenegro

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1.Inter-ethnic social distances index 2. Religiosity 3. Choose own country 4. Trust politicians	2.697 9.721 -0.101 9.980 8.574	0.17 -0.15 0.14 0.10	3.467 3.004 -3.179 2.713 2.039
Observations: 500	Adjusted R2: 0.23

Table 1-4: Linear regression results, dependent variable support for democratic regime index, Macedonia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Support for NATO membership 2. European Union membership index 3. Place of residence 4. Enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens 5. Specific support 6. In economy some people’s gain is a gain for entire society 7. Education 8. Inter-ethnic social distances index 9. Go into politics to get rich 10. Monthly income 11. Private entrepreneur in family 12. Market thinking index	6.199 -0.590 0.145 0.182 0.234 -0.225 0.172 0.170 2.399 0.178 -0.120 -0.291 3.641	-0.24 0.175 0.17 0.145 -0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.09 0.08 -0.08 -0.07 0.07	4.718 -6.621 4.941 4.580 4.424 -2.557 3.125 2.611 -2.536 2.113 -2.057 -2.192 2.027
Observations: 820	Adjusted R2: 0.37

Table 2-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable inter-ethnic social distances index, Bulgaria

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Ethnic group belonging 2. Political representation of ethnic groups 3. Proud to be Bulgarian citizen 4. Proud to be Bulgarian 5. Family income now compared with two years ago 6. Place of residence 7. Prosperity in Bulgaria through illegal affairs or honesty 8. Education 9. Market thinking index 10. Trust politicians 11. In economy some people’s gain is a gain for the entire society	4.891 3.634 0.570 -1.054 3.039 -1.273 -0.609 0.292 0.803 0.165 -0.855 0.818	0.30 0.14 -0.12 0.12 -0.11 -0.105 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.08 0.08	0.602 7.780 4.268 -3.595 2.896 -2.649 -2.676 2.461 2.408 2.207 -2.414 2.471
Observations: 1072	Adjusted R2: 0.28

Table 2-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable inter-ethnic social distances index, Serbia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Security – only through good relations of different ethnic groups 2. Place of residence 3. Support for democratic regime principles index 4. Choose own country 5. Self-identification 6. Satisfaction with the rule of Slobodan Milosevic 7. Political representation of ethnic groups 8. Specific support index 9. Parties serve interests of their leaders 10. Market thinking index 11. Enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens 12. Proud to be Serb	-6.176 0.555 0.800 1.521 1.178 -2.207 -0.455 0.466 1.439 -1.029 0.212 0.903 0.580	0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.075 0.065	-0.709 3.413 3.212 3.525 3.175 -3.569 -3.169 2.936 2.260 -2.453 2.359 2.410 2.001
Observations: 1000	Adjusted R2: 0.29

Table 2-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable inter-ethnic social distances index, Montenegro

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Proud to be Yugoslavian citizen 2. Cooperative thinking 3. Ethnic group belonging 4. Support for democratic regime principles index 5. Market thinking index	-2.207 1.892 0.624 1.264 2.127 0.564	0.18 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.09	-0.189 3.811 4.000 3.200 3.044 2.307
Observations: 500	Adjusted R2: .35

Table 2-4: Linear regression results, dependent variable inter-ethnic social distances index, Macedonia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Ethnic group belonging 2. Trust Church 3. Support for democratic regime principles index 4. Choose own country 5. Religion 6. European Union integration index 7. No differences between political parties	7.408 1.875 -0.767 0.350 0.577 0.677 0.237 0.257	0.25 -0.14 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07	1.457 6.298 -3.592 2.536 2.567 2.177 2.096 2.143
Observations: 820	Adjusted R2: 0.25

Table 3-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable market thinking index, Bulgaria

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Support for NATO membership 2. Support for democratic regime principles index 3. Private entrepreneur in family 4. Employment status 5. In our country when some people get rich other get necessarily poor 6. Satisfaction with the communist regime 7. In economic affairs, one person’s gain is always another’s loss 8. Trust politicians 9. Age	12.671 -0.970 0.368 -1.694 -0.308 -0.593 -0.152 -0.501 -0.445 -1.825	-0.15 0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.085 -0.07	3.698 -5.140 4.493 -4.325 -2.848 -3.390 -3.109 -3.346 -2.963 -2.331
Observations: 1072	Adjusted R2: .0 37

Table 3-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable market thinking index, Serbia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Co Constant 1. In our country when some people get rich other get necessarily poor 2. Not proud of being Yugoslavian citizen 3. Choose own country 4. Family income compared with the average for the country 5. Support for NATO membership 6. Saving abilities of the family 7. Support for democratic regime principles index 8. Ordinary people excluded from power 9. Inter-ethnic social distances index 10. 10. In economy some people’s gain is a gain for entire society	20,080 -0.819 0.551 -0.512 0.794 -0.661 -0.909 0.406 -0.399 0.2.778 0.263	-0.145 0.13 -0.12 0.12 0.11 -0.10 0.08 -0.08 0.07 0.06	6.509 -4.726 3.731 -3.825 3.773 -3.490 -3.092 2.595 -2.457 2.359 2.058
Observations: 1000	Adjusted R2: 0.36

Table 3-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable market thinking index, Montenegro

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Country run by few interests 2. In our country when some people get rich others necessarily get poor 3. Inter-ethnic social distances index 4. Trust politicians 5. Non-cooperative thinking 6. Place of residence	16.461 -0.702 -0.345 2.124 -.259 -6.153 -0.199	-0.16 -0.14 0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10	7.752 -2.710 -2.579 2.307 -2.144 -2.006 -2,084
Observations: 500	R2: 0.22

Table 3-4: Linear regression results, dependent variable market thinking index, Macedonia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. In economic affairs, one person’s gain is always another’s loss 2. Specific support index 3. Vision of political representation of ethnic groups 4. The enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens 5. Ordinary people excluded from power 6. Choose own country or not 7. Type of property of the working place 8. Inter-ethnic social distances index 9. Support for democratic regime principles index 10. Have a private entrepreneur in family	13.221 -0.595 0.531 -3.386 -0.453 -0.401 -0.331 0.284 4.854 0.148 -0.538	-0.17 0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 0.09 0.085 0.07 -0.07	5.002 -5.049 3.003 -2.101 -3.242 -2.790 -2.788 2.018 2.545 2.027 -2.010
Observations: 820	Adjusted R2: 0.36

Table 4-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable vision of political representation of ethnic groups – Bulgaria

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Sociotropic comparison 10 years ago 2. Inter-ethnic social distances index 3. Conflict between people speaking different languages 4. Religion 5. The enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens 6. Ordinary people excluded from power 7. Saving abilities of the family 8. Self-esteem of social class 9. Ethnic group belonging 10. Support for democratic regime principles index	6.262 -0.702 3.578 0.394 0.373 0.320 0.322 0.904 -0.379 -0.241 9.754	0.18 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.09 -0.09 0.09 0.08	3.267 -5.555 4.499 4.581 3.424 4.528 3.067 3.016 -2.335 -2.001 2.008
Observations: 1072	Adjusted R2: 0.215		F-statistic: 5,113

Table 4-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable vision of political representation of ethnic groups – Serbia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Dissatisfaction with regime of Slobodan Milosevic 2. Inter-ethnic social distances index 3. Support for democratic regime principles index 4. Choose own country or not 5. The enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens	6.242 0.166 3.625 0.194 0.201 0.176	0.18 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.07	3.256 5.141 4.943 3.551 2.362 2.119
Observations: 1000	Adjusted R2: 0.18		F-statistic: 3,897

Table 4-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable vision of political representation of ethnic groups – Montenegro

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. Inter-ethnic social distances index 2. Support for democratic regime principles index 3. Choose own country or not 4. Place of residence	8.418 3.210 0.215 0.263 -0.258	0.16 0.14 0.11 -0.105	3.221 2.819 2.467 2.019 -2.178
Observations: 500	Adjusted R2: 0.185		F-statistic: 1,916

Table 4-4: Linear regression results, dependent variable vision of political representation of ethnic groups – Macedonia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant 1. No differences between political parties 2. Conflict between people speaking different languages 3. Self-identification 4. Support for democratic regime principles index 5. Conflict between nationalists and those who are not nationalists	-1,802 1.452 -1.296 -2.373 0.675 1.297	0.20 -0.11 -0.11 0.09 0.09	-0.164 5.608 2.550 -2.986 2.227 2.232
Observations: 820	Adjusted R2: 0.135		F-statistic: 2,252

Table 5-1 Factor analyses results

Bulgaria

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
*Trust politicians *Ordinary people excluded from power *Only people who mean to get rich go into politics *In our country when some get rich others necessarily get poor	*In business there are not necessarily losers in all cases *In economy some people’s gain is a gain for the entire society *It is possible for an economic conflict to be resolved so that all are winners. *The enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens	*Inter-ethnic social distances index *Political representation of ethnic groups	*In our country one can achieve good life through illegal affairs or hard work (-) *Relative deprivation (comparison with parents when being the same age)

Serbia

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
*Trust politicians *Ordinary people excluded from power *Only people who mean to get rich go into politics *In our country when some get rich others necessarily get poor	*In economy some people’s gain is a gain for the entire society *It is possible economic conflict to be resolved so that all are winners. *The enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens	*Inter-ethnic social distances index *Political representation of ethnic groups	*In business there are not necessarily losers in all cases *In economy one person’s gain is always another’s loss	*Relative deprivation (comparison with parents when being the same age)

Montenegro

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
*Trust politicians *Ordinary people excluded from power *Only people who mean to get rich go into politics *In our country when some get rich others necessarily get poor *In our country one can achieve good life through illegal affairs or hard work (-)	*In economy some people’s gain is a gain for the entire society *It is possible for an economic conflict to be resolved so that all are winners. *The enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens	*Interethnic social distances index *Political representation of ethnic groups	*In business there are not necessarily losers in all cases *In economy one person’s gain is always another’s loss	*Relative deprivation (comparison with parents when being the same age)

Macedonia

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
*Trust politicians *Ordinary people excluded from power *Only people who mean to get rich go into politics	*In economy some people’s gain is a gain for the entire society *It is possible economic conflict to be resolved so that all are winners. *The enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens	*Relative deprivation (comparison with parents when being the same age) (-) * In economy some people’s gain is always another’s loss *In our country when some get rich others necessarily get poor	*In our country one can achieve good life through illegal affairs or hard work *Political representation of ethnic groups	*Inter-ethnic social distances index *In business there are not necessarily losers in all cases

Notes

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[1] This study is based on a cross-national representative comparative survey thatwhich I designed and had conductedcommissioned last year in four Balkan post-communist countries – Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro.

[2] When referring to South Eeastern Europe or the Balkans weI will mean the four examined countries being examined, only with the exception of Romania, which has some distinct historical specificspeculiarities that are quite distinct from the studied Balkan countries.

[3] See Janos Kornai, 1985

[4] WeI supposedassume that relative deprivation wouldill be closely tied with the index of interethnic social distances. However, there is no such trend for the all countries examined. Only in Macedonia and Bulgaria relative deprivation is connected with zero-sum perceptions of economic realities.

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[1] This study is based on a cross-national representative comparative survey, which I designed and commissioned in four Balkan post-communist countries – Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro.

[2] When referring to South East Europe or the Balkans I will mean the four countries being examined, with the exception of Romania which has some distinct historical peculiarities.

[3] I assumed that relative deprivation would be closely tied with the index of inter-ethnic social distances. However, there is no such trend for all countries examined. Only in Macedonia and Bulgaria is relative deprivation is connected with zero-sum perceptions of economic realities.

[3] The only peculiar case is that of Bulgaria, where zero-sum perceptions of economic reality and economic principles increase support for democracy. This peculiarity was explained in the study by the difficulties of the post-communist transformation in the country, the impact of ‘mafia’ type lobbies upon the slow economic reforms, and the persistence of ill-defined rules of the economic game for a long time during the transformation period. Thus, support for the democratic regime in Bulgaria is increased not only by zero-sum perceptions of the rules of the current economic reality, but also by the very zero-sum perception of the economic principles as such. Hence, the understanding of the general economic laws as a zero-sum game is influenced by the economic practices in the country during the 12 years of post-communist transformation. Here we cannot explain the zero-sum economic attitudes among Bulgarians by their ‘stupidity’ or ‘underdevelopment’ because there is nothing in the heads of the individuals that does not reflect the social reality they inhabit. The increased perception of economic rules in the country as a zero-sum game raises support for a democratic regime and inter-ethnic tolerance. This means that the low support for democratic regime principles and low inter-ethnic acceptance are defined by non-zero-sum economic thinking. Thus, the evaluation of economic reality as fair presupposes an anti-democratic vision of the socio-political system in Bulgaria and low tolerance to ethnic minorities.

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